The justification bias in the estimated impact of health shocks on retirement is mitigated by using objective health measures from a large, register-based longitudinal data set including medical diagnosis codes, along with labor market status, financial, and socio-economic variables. The duration until retirement is modeled using single and competing risk specifications, observed and unobserved heterogeneity, and flexible baseline hazards. Wealth is used as a proxy for elapsed duration to mitigate the potential selection bias stemming from conditioning on initial participation. The competing risk specification distinguishes complete multiperiod routes to retirement, such as unemployment followed by early retirement. A result on comparison of coefficients across all states is offered. The empirical results indicate a strong impact of health changes on retirement and hence a large potential for public policy measures intended to retain older workers longer in the labor force. Disability responds more to health shocks than early retirement, especially to diseases of the circulatory, respiratory, and musculoskeletal systems, as well as mental and behavioral disorders. Some unemployment spells followed by early retirement appear voluntary and spurred by life style diseases.
INTRODUCTION
Changes in health may impact individual labor supply decisions, and this has important public policy ramifications. Thus, estimation of the relation between health changes and labor supply is an important empirical issue. A particularly pressing problem is the labor supply of older cohorts approaching the retirement decision and at the same time facing health change hazards that increase with age. As the population ages and the dependency ratio deteriorates, policy makers must search for instruments to retain older workers longer in the labor market. Thus, if it is possible to empirically identify specific health-related impediments to continued work, then this points to potentially fruitful avenues of investment in improved health.
In this paper, we consider merged register data on individual objective medical diagnosis codes and early retirement behavior for a large, representative Danish sample of older workers drawn at random from the full population. The panel structure of the data allows following individuals year by year from the age of 50 and precisely measures period by period changes in objectively measured individual health, labor market status, and other relevant financial and socio-economic explanatory variables. We consider 12 broad, mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories of health diagnoses defined by aggregation across codes in the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, . This coding of diseases and signs, symptoms, abnormal findings, complaints, social circumstances, and external causes of injury or diseases, as classified by the World Health Organization, includes more than 22,000 different codes. The diagnosis codes age pension (OAP), available at age 67 during our sample period, but follow individuals from age 50 to 66. Using medical diagnosis codes as opposed to self-reports (general or more specific) of health should mitigate the justification bias. Large sample size and presumably relatively low measurement error in the register data should mitigate the attenuation bias. Following individuals over time to identify actual retirement dates rather than self-reports of initial plans and using period by period changes in objective health measures based on medical diagnosis codes rather than health at a point in time allow estimating the dynamic labor supply response at the time of the onset of the health problem in question, treating the health change as exogenous (no survey element). We adopt a tractable, relatively flexible, and robust hazard model specification, using the actual timing of labor supply events and changes in health, financial, demographic, and socio-economic variables to define the relevant response variables and time-varying regressors. Throughout, both men and women are included in the estimations, and we present separate results by gender in one of the main specifications, whereas including gender dummies in all others. To the extent that the objective diagnosis codes eliminate the justification bias, and the large register panel and period by period changes reduce the error in measurement of true work incapacity, leaving only a reduced attenuation (and any remaining simultaneity) bias, our estimates of the impact of health changes on labor supply, and hence of the potential effect of policy directed toward improved health, should, if anything, be on the conservative side.
Following individuals from age 50 and conditioning on labor market participation at this age imply that our results are not representative for the full population, including those who tend to enter nonparticipation and retirement states even before 50. Those with high hazard in the full population may have already retired before age 50 and so are underrepresented in the sample, and those with long spells are overrepresented. This may not be a particularly serious problem because our focus is on early retirement among workers not subject to loose attachment issues (as opposed to OAP retirement and early retirement associated with limited job careers). Nevertheless, we may have lost some individuals to retirement or other nonparticipation prior to 50 that should have been in our sample. We implement two corrections of the resulting stock sampling bias, controlling for (i) observed heterogeneity and (ii) unobserved heterogeneity because either would induce bias if left uncorrected. For (i), using observed regressors capturing the difference between individuals with high and low participation rates, and therefore, respectively, low and high hazards before age 50, clearly mitigates the bias. Salant (1977) and Ridder (1982) suggested conditioning on elapsed duration (of participation) for this purpose. We do not have data on elapsed duration before age 50. Lacking this, we propose in the present paper to condition instead on wealth. Our wealth variable includes pension savings and should correlate with past participation, thus mitigating the stock sampling bias. As for (ii), we consider in addition correction for any possible unobserved heterogeneity that may remain after conditioning on observed regressors. Unobserved heterogeneity may exist regardless of the sampling scheme and so is of interest to recognize for purposes of correct distributional specification in a likelihood framework. Furthermore, it may arise in our context to the extent that wealth is only an imperfect proxy for elapsed duration. Unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for by allowing explicitly for its presence in the likelihood function, following Singer (1984a,1984b) and Hougaard (1984) .
Conditioning on wealth and allowing for possible unobserved heterogeneity should suffice for mitigating the selection bias, as this should be of limited magnitude in any case, for several reasons. Firstly, participation at age 50 is high in Denmark (79.3% for women and 94.0% for men in 1985). Secondly, the smaller group that tends to enter nonparticipation before 50 is less interesting from the point of view of policy reforms intended to keep older workers longer in the labor market. Finally, there is no point considering an alternative flow sampling procedure, adding participating individuals who turn 50 in subsequent years because this would not alter representativeness. 1 We consider both discrete and continuous unobserved heterogeneity. The available methods from the literature do not necessarily cover all cases of potential interest, but the development of further generalizations coefficients across all states in the competing risk framework, in contrast to having only an interpretation of the smallest and largest coefficients.
For the purpose of modeling financial incentives, we limit ourselves to income (own and household) and household wealth, given our focus on the impact of health changes on labor supply. Own income should pick up a good portion of the substitution effect, particularly for the early retirement and disability exit routes, where the benefit amounts are fixed during our sample period and so the replacement rate varies inversely with income, but also for the unemployment routes, where the replacement rate is fixed (at 90%) only up to a maximum income level that is binding for most workers, then again varies inversely with income. Wealth should make retirement more affordable, that is, an income effect, and it is an empirical question whether this feature is shared by household income. Our wealth measure includes private pension savings that vary considerably across the population and so should act as an informative explanatory variable for retirement, whereas retirement benefits from public (pay-as-you-go financed) programs vary much less. An alternative approach to prediction of the timing of the actual retirement date could be based on the accrual of pension wealth based on the present discounted value of the future benefit stream each individual is eligible for. However, tracking such a constructed measure and comparing to current (and predicted future) working income might not yield a complete picture because of better than fair actuarial adjustments when reaching key eligibility ages. Although the benefit structure looks better than working income today, the difference may be expected to be higher in the future. This led Coile and Gruber (2001) to calculate a peak value, comparing current pension wealth with that in the year in which it is predicted to reach its maximum. The resulting decision rule is the special case of the option value approach of Stock and Wise (1990) corresponding to risk neutrality and zero utility of leisure, that is, the peak value is the financial (as opposed to utility adjusted) option value. The option value approach (and variants thereof) does not account for the agent's possibility of reoptimizing in future time periods upon resolution of uncertainty, for example, about future income and health shocks, and so is biased toward too early retirement, which would be the reason to go to a full dynamic programming life cycle model (see, e.g., Rust and Phelan (1997) ). Essentially, the option (and hence peak) value approach is to form expectations of the relevant future random variables and then choose the maximum across alternative streams, whereas the full dynamic programming approach differs in that the expectation and maximum operators are interchanged (see Christensen and Kiefer (2009) ).
Because of the numerical complexities of the more sophisticated structural approaches, they are usually implemented with only a small number of explanatory variables, and their successful use requires information about eligibility for the various programs, income in alternative unobserved states, and so on. In the Danish case, eligibility, for example, for early retirement, depends on whether the individual has been member of a UI fund for sufficiently long and benefit levels, for example, for civil service pension, depends on years of service, neither of which is in our data. Disability benefits depend on which of the four different types (levels) of disability the individual qualifies for, and all benefit types may be supplemented by housing allowances, support for heating expenses, medicine, domestic help, and so on, all of which would be hard to predict for any given individual. Bingley et al. (2004) did show a calculation of pension wealth and peak value by using Danish data and estimated an option value model, assigning population frequencies in a distribution over possible disability levels for each individual. Instead, our general reduced form hazard specification uses a large number of time-varying covariates proxying for the variables of interest, for example, an indicator for current UI fund membership that in combination with observed labor market experience and the baseline hazard should capture the effect of early retirement eligibility, income and wealth variables capturing financial incentives and all the health variables of interest. Our nonparametric baseline hazards exhibit clear peaks at 60 and 63, ages that on the basis of the institutional setting would likely have corresponded to peak values in an alternative option-style analysis, suggesting that the econometric specification captures the portion of the left out eligibility information not controlled through labor market regressors such as UI fund membership and experience and therefore that the inference on the health variables included should be valid.
In general, our empirical results regarding financial, demographic, and socio-economic variables make sense, relative to the literature, indicating that our sample is not somehow unusual. The single state analysis suffices to show that the propensity to retire is higher among individuals who have experienced unemployment or received remain ill by the end of the year may put labor market decisions temporarily on hold, thus also contributing to the negative coefficient (delaying retirement). In addition to these somewhat ad hoc interpretations, we find in the sequel a partial solution to the puzzle. Thus, the conditional probability that a given labor market exit is into disability is higher for individuals who have survived malignant cancer, even though malignant cancer itself obtains a negative coefficient for the disability state in the competing risk model. This suggests that the data line up in a meaningful pattern across exit routes and diagnoses, even though raw rates are down after surviving malignant cancer. Survivors of malignant cancer who do retire have a stronger tendency to go on disability than other retirees. It is also reasonable to assume that death as a censoring variable is not strictly exogenous with respect to a serious health condition such as malignant cancer, and this may affect the result on this condition more than others. Regardless of the precise mechanism behind the negative coefficient, the effect does not carry over to other serious conditions, for example, diseases of the circulatory system, including life threatening conditions such as heart attack. Frequently, malignant cancer leads to longer hospitalization and absence from work for more than a year, whereas heart attacks and so on may be resolved in a bypass operation or similar, and the individual resumes work sooner if surviving. Thus, among survivors of the two types of health shocks, those surviving malignant cancer are less likely to be back at work and ready to make the retirement decision at the end of the first year, and if they are back, they are likely to have lost more work time and hence pension savings and therefore have a stronger financial incentive to catch up. Finally, the received negative coefficient is only the marginal (or partial) effect, controlling for all other regressors, whereas the full effect of a health shock includes that operating through the resulting increases in variables such as sickness pay, number of admissions, and days of treatment that act more as mediators than confounders, that is, the total effect may very well be positive.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 introduces the data. Section 3 presents the econometric methodology and discusses the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
DATA
The full database contains annual observations on all individuals in Denmark above 18 years of age for the period 1985-2001, with measurement in November each year. The data are based on administrative registers and contain no survey element. We have information on various individual demographic, financial, and socio-economic characteristics, health, and labor market status. This enables us to identify individual transitions between different labor market states and health events on an annual basis.
The sample used in this study is drawn at random from the set of all individuals who are exactly 50 years old and active in the labor market in 1985. We follow them until retirement, death, or end of study period (2001), whichever is first. Excluding the age group 18-49 avoids early retirement associated with limited job careers and loose labor market attachment. Ending in 2001 when the individuals followed turn 67 (the official OAP age during the study period) ensures a focus on retirement at earlier ages.
2 We exclude individuals who are outside the labor market the first time we observe them. We include the employed and all unemployed workers who are actively looking for a job (namely, receive benefits and therefore satisfy certain job search requirements).
The duration variable takes the value zero in the base year (age 50), and we then follow a person until he or she reaches the age of 67 and is no longer at risk of retiring early. This implies a maximum duration of 17 years. A single spell covers the years the individual actively participates in the labor market after the age of 50. For example, a person could be employed, unemployed, reemployed, and then retire, and total spell length is the number of years spent in the three first states. Thus, the duration is defined as Duration ¼ Retirement age À 50:
(1) Right censoring occurs at age 67 or in the event of death. By definition, spells start at age 50, so there is no left censoring. Table I shows the duration data. Our sample consists of 9329 individuals. Two different measures are presented. The first is the number of observed spells by duration. The second is the number of observed exits to a retirement program. The difference between the two represents censoring because of death or survey end (at age 67). The distribution of exits is well spread out across different durations. The three smallest cell counts are for the two shortest and the longest durations. For numerical purposes, the first two durations are combined when we conduct the semiparametric analysis in the following text, and the last is censored (right censoring occurs a year early) because individuals participating at age 66 in all but six cases continue until 67 (OAP). Table II contains descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables. Because we only observe that an exit to retirement has occurred sometime within a given year, we use explanatory variables for year t À 1 (previous November) to explain the retirement hazard in year t. This avoids a potential endogeneity issue arising if the value of a given characteristic is influenced by the retirement event. Means and standard deviations are over all 98,465 person-years. All explanatory variables may vary during the labor market spell. They are used as time-varying regressors and normalized to the [0, 1] interval for estimation purposes. Panel A reports statistics for standard labor market and socio-economic background variables typically used in retirement studies. Panel B reports statistics for financial and health variables, including the medical diagnosis codes.
The geographical variable City is an indicator taking the value one for residence within the Copenhagen (the capital) metropolitan area, zero otherwise, and the 35% share is representative. The variable Married takes the value one if the individual has an identified partner, the category including both those who are married and those cohabitating. Male is the gender dummy. In our sample, 80% are married or cohabiting. There are more male (57%) than female participants in the sample because of conditioning on participation.
Labor market attachment is expected to differ between full-time and part-time workers. Two-thirds of the sample consists of full-time workers. The yearly Unemployment rate is based on the number of hours the individual has been unemployed relative to the number of possible hours worked. It may reflect multiple unemployment spells during the year. The rate is 6% on average, but varies considerably across the sample, with a standard deviation of 19%. The variable Experience is defined as the individual's work experience since 1980. As durations are measured starting in 1985, we always have a least a 5-year interval for measurement of the experience variable. -age 55  295  249  6-age 56  326  287  7-age 57  492  455  8-age 58  603  556  9-age 59  695  637  10-age 60  1606  1548  11-age 61  968  925  12-age 62  578  540  13-age 63  675  628  14-age 64  514  479  15-age 65  332  314  16-age 66  211  187  17-age 67  1195  6  Total  9329  7478 A full-time employee can achieve a maximum of 1.00 over the 22 years from 1980 to 2001 and a part-time employee .75. The indicator variable Sickness pay takes the value one if the individual has received sickness pay during the year. This is intended to capture undiagnosed illness, thus complementing the indicators for diagnosis codes (see the following text). The first two days of illness are covered by the employer, and less than 1% of the sample actually experience longer sickness spells and receive sickness pay. Nevertheless, the variable is strongly significant in several of our specifications in the following text. Membership of a UI fund is part of the eligibility criteria for some of the retirement schemes, and membership exists in 77% of the observed person-years. Education is divided into five categories: Basic, Vocational, Short, Medium, and Long and is defined on basis on the individual's highest completed education level. Basic refers to primary or high school only. Short, Medium, and Long are all higher educations beyond the high school level. Long includes all university degrees at the Bachelor level or higher, as well as engineers and architects with 5 years or longer programs. Short and Medium refer to non-university degrees, with Short including less academic programs than Medium and the latter typically requiring about 4 years after high school. Examples of educations under Short include real estate broker, actor, correspondent, technician with some training beyond vocational, laboratory worker, and so on. Medium includes school teacher, journalist, librarian, accountant, nurse, midwife, social worker, army officer, some engineering, and so on. Because we look at older cohorts, only 4% has long higher education in our sample, and nearly half the sample has only basic education, whereas about one-third has vocational training.
Job characteristics are described through occupational indicators: Self-employed, Assisting spouse, Salaried worker at high, medium, and low level, and Unskilled. These are broad categories, with 10% or more in each, except only 3% in Assisting spouse. Among Salaried workers, high level includes directors, managers, and so on, medium level is other office personnel, and low level is skilled blue-collar workers.
Turning to Panel B of Table II , there are three financial indicators, all deflated to 2000 levels and measured in logarithms, namely own income, 3 total household income, and household net wealth based on calculations from the tax authorities. We do not have separate data on alternative income in the retirement state, but the replacement rate varies inversely with current income for most individuals in our sample. In addition to serving as a financial measure in its own right, wealth proxies for elapsed duration prior to 1985 and thus, in part, controls for differences in sampling frequency between individuals with high and low participations (we use a stock sampling scheme). As expected, the standard deviation is greater on wealth than on the income variables. Because we control for household income and marital status, we do not separately control for spouse's retirement status.
In addition to these standard background characteristics, we have information about the individual's health situation over time through individual objective medical diagnosis codes. These data are drawn from the Danish National Registry for Patients and includes information about admissions, actual diagnoses, treatments, and discharges for all patients who have been in contact with clinical hospital departments in Denmark during the period. After 1994, information about out-patient treatments or emergency room visits is also available. The essential feature is that we have information about the objective medical diagnoses made at the time of a hospital discharge and thereby avoid the justification bias related to self-reported health measures.
Within each year, we have multiple observations for a given patient because the possibility of several admissions exists (approximately one-third of the patients experience more than one admission within a given year). Furthermore, in relation to an admission, the patient is diagnosed with a main condition and possibly several additional conditions. The different diagnoses are organized in relation to World Health Organization 's ICD. From 1980 to 1993 , ICD-8 is used and from 1994 to 2001 . This information is summarized in 12 dummy variables, each taking the value one if a person has been diagnosed with a disease in the associated category within the year. The categories we consider are the following: (i) Malignant cancer (includes leukemia, melanoma, and other malignant cancers); (ii) Benign cancer (various types of tumors); (iii) Endocrine, nutritional, and metabolic diseases (e.g., diabetes, obesity, etc.); (iv) Mental and behavioral disorders (dementia, delirium, schizophrenia, stress-related disorders, etc.); (v) Diseases of the nervous system and sensory organs (Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, epilepsy, sclerosis, migraine, apnea, cataract, hearing loss, etc.); (vi) Diseases of the circulatory system (ischaemic, coronary, cardiovascular and other heart diseases, angina pectoris, heart attack, acute rheumatic fever, high blood pressure, hypertension, stroke, etc.); (vii) Diseases of the respiratory system (influenza, pneumonia, bronchitis, asthma, and other lung diseases); (viii) Diseases of the digestive system (gastric ulcer, hernia, diseases of the liver and gallbladder, etc.); (ix) Diseases of the genitourinary system (kidney stone, renal failure, other diseases of the urinary system and genital organs); (x) Diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue (arthritis, osteoarthritis, Lyme disease, herniated disk, lumbago, osteoporosis, sclerosis, rheumatism, gout); (xi) Injury, poisoning, and other consequences of external causes (bone fractures, dislocations, etc.); (xii) Other diseases. Both main and additional diagnoses are included because it may be just as likely that it is an additional diagnosis that influences the decision to retire early. Furthermore, the number of days of treatment, number of diagnoses, and number of admissions within a given year are included. The type of health event occurring in most person-years (1.9%) is (vi) Diseases of the circulatory system, including stroke. This is followed by (viii) Diseases of the digestive system (1.4%), including ulcer. There are more admissions than either days of treatment or diagnoses across person-years, indicating that many admissions do not lead to any treatment and that multiple admissions within a given year may lead to the same diagnosis. Figure 1 shows the nonparametric estimate of the full sample retirement hazard function h and associated confidence band. Specifically, in the annual data, the possible durations until retirement are j = 1, . . ., 17, corresponding to age 51, . . ., 67 in the figure. Define for each duration j the quantities • d j : number of individuals observed to retire at j • m j : number of observed spells censored at j • n j : number of individuals not yet retired (i.e., still at risk) at j À 1. This group consists of those with a completed or censored spell of duration j or longer: Then the hazard rate is estimated as the number of individuals retiring relative to the number at risk,
that is, the jth increment to the estimatorĤ j ¼ P i⩽j d i =n i of the cumulative hazard function by Nelson (1972) and Aalen (1978) . The corresponding product-limit estimate of the survivor function by Kaplan and Meier (1958) 
Johansen (1978) provided an interpretation of this as a maximum likelihood estimator in a wide variety of settings. The asymptotic variance ofŜ j is estimated using the method of Greenwood (1926) ,
and the corresponding variance of estimated hazard (3) is
forming the basis of the confidence band in Figure 1 .
There is positive duration dependence initially and a clear peak at age 60 (duration 10), reflecting the early retirement program that becomes available at this age (for those having paid into the system for sufficiently long, see Section 3). There is a second (lower) peak at age 63, reflecting an incentive to postpone early retirement until this age, built into the system from 1992 (see Section 3-the peak at 63 occurs in 1998 for our sample, i.e., well after the 1992 reform). The shape of the overall hazard function is in accordance with earlier findings on early retirement in Denmark (Pedersen and Smith (1996) , An et al. (2004) ). Of course, the nonparametric estimates only reveal average transition rates out of work, not how these vary with health and other characteristics of the sample.
ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
Although our data are grouped in that duration is measured in whole years, it is conceptually useful to start the analysis with the underlying continuous time duration, say, T. The distribution of T is characterized by the conditional hazard rate out of employment, given time-varying regressors x t ,
assuming the limit exists. Of course, with grouped data, the continuous time hazard function is not nonparametrically identified.
Grouped duration analysis
The grouped data approach summarizes the information on staying in the initial state or exiting in each time interval in a sequence of binary outcomes, see Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1973) for the constant regressor case, and for the general case Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) , Kiefer (1988) , Han and Hausman (1990) , Lancaster (1990), and McCall (1994) . Thus, divide the time line into K + 1 intervals, [0,
, where the t k are known constants. 4 Any duration falling into the last interval, [t K , 1), is censored at t K . Given explanatory variables at level x k over the course of the kth interval, the conditional probability that duration T is greater than t k given that it is greater than t k À 1 is
thus defining the probability a k = a k (x k , θ) for given unknown parameter vector θ to be estimated. 5 Given T is not in one of the k À 1 first intervals, the probability that it is in the kth interval is 1 À a k , and with probability a k , it is in a later interval, so a k and 1 À a k are the discrete time conditional survivor and hazard, respectively. The individual contribution to the likelihood function for an individual with duration in the kth interval and observed regressors
where d = 1 if the duration is uncensored and zero otherwise. The log likelihood function for a sample of n individuals, with the ith retiring in the k i th interval, for observed regressors x i, j is therefore
In each of our specifications, the maximum likelihood estimate of θ is computed by maximizing (10) numerically, using the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno algorithm (see Broyden (1970 ), Fletcher (1970 , Goldfarb (1970), and Shanno (1970) ), and asymptotic standard errors are calculated off the square roots of the diagonal elements of the inverse of the matrix summing the outer products of the individual score contributions (see Berndt et al. (1974) ). The convergence tolerance for the score with respect to each coefficient is set to 1.0eÀ4. We consider three alternative specifications of the probabilities a k from (8) that are used in (10). In the Cox (1972) proportional hazard case (see also Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1973) ), we assume that the hazard is the product of a baseline hazard, l(t), depending only on time and a function specifying the effect of the explanatory variables. Taking the latter as the exponential in x ′ t b, where b are regression coefficients of interest, 4 We have t k = k and K = 16 in the simplest specification, but unevenly spaced intervals are used when combining the short and censoring the longest durations for numerical purposes in the semiparametric analysis. 5 Heuristically, suppressing regressors x, we have from (7) that h(t) = f(t)/S(t), where f and S are the density and survivor functions for T, that is,
ensures the interpretation
that is, when shifting a given covariate, the corresponding coefficient in b gives the resulting proportional change in the hazard. We still allow the covariates x t to vary between intervals k, so the hazard may vary over time because of changes in both factors in (11). In this case,
where
l t ð Þdt is the increment to the integrated baseline hazard over the k′th interval. This is inserted in (10) to construct the log likelihood function. In the first of our three a k specifications, a separate parameter Λ k is associated with each interval for the grouped data, that is, θ = (b, Λ 1 , . . ., Λ K ) in (10), following Kiefer (1988) . This approach is semiparametric, allowing a general unspecified baseline hazard l(Á) and estimating this only up to its integrals Λ k over the K intervals given by the data collection mechanism. Taking x t to be constant within each interval is without loss of generality because in any case, our explanatory variables are only observed at the same frequency as the durations (whereas continuously varying regressors would require integration over the observed path between t k À 1 and t k , see Petersen (1986) ). The alternative partial likelihood approach of Cox (1975) similarly takes the regressors to be constant within intervals and avoids dealing with the baseline altogether by estimating b off the ranks of the durations, but it requires a rule for breaking ties among the durations, using, for example, the approximations to the partial log likelihood function by Breslow (1974) or Efron (1977) , and unlike our approach using (10), it does not allow an investigation of the shape of the baseline hazard.
Our second (restricted) model specification is obtained by parametrizing the baseline hazard, deriving the resulting form for Λ k and hence a k and estimating the parameters of the baseline specification along with b. We consider the exponential distribution with its associated constant hazard,
a benchmark case in duration analysis because it exhibits no duration dependence. In this case,
to be inserted in (13), so θ = (b, g) in the estimation. A natural generalization allowing for duration dependence is the Weibull specification. If T a is exponential, then T is Weibull with shape parameter a. This model has been applied frequently, for example, to the duration of unemployment spells, see Lancaster (1979) and Nickell (1979) . The Weibull baseline hazard is given by
with scale parameter g and duration dependence a À 1, that is, this can be positive or negative, corresponding to monotonically increasing or decreasing baseline, and the special case a = 1 is the exponential. In the Weibull case,
and this is inserted in (13) for our third specification of a k , so θ = (b, g, a) in log likelihood (10) in this case.
Unobserved heterogeneity
The models, so far, only allow for observed heterogeneity, controlled for through the regressors x t . We now consider, in addition, unobserved heterogeneity entering via an individual-specific term v, so that the conditional hazard is of the form h(t|x t , v) (see, e.g., Hougaard (1984) ). Maintaining proportionality as in (11), this yields the mixed proportional hazard specification
Conditionally on the heterogeneity term, discrete time survivor (13) becomes
The likelihood function is formed by integrating out the unobserved v i by using a parametric or nonparametric distributional assumption. Writing G(v|x, θ) for the conditional heterogeneity distribution, the general form of the individual contribution to likelihood is obtained by substituting (19) for a k in (9) and integrating,
where again d = 1 if the labor market spell is not right censored. Rewriting this expression, we have
Gðdvjx; θÞ
where M G {Á} is recognized as the moment generating function corresponding to the unobserved heterogeneity distribution G. The model is identified if v is independent of observed regressors x and the distribution G is suitably normalized, for example, to unit mean (alternatively, b should include no intercept), following Elbers and Ridder (1982) . In our empirical work, we consider both discrete and continuous unobserved heterogeneity distributions G. In the continuous case, we consider the scaled Gamma distribution G(dv|x, θ) = g(v|θ)dv with unit mean (for identification) and var(v) = s 2 , that is, the density is
Inserting this in (21), we obtain the log likelihood for n individuals, to be compared with (10),
A slightly different log likelihood function was derived by Meyer (1990) who only attributed a duration k i À 1 to right censored individuals, instead of k i as with our definitions. 6 The parameter vector is
) with no baseline duration dependence, and θ = (b, s 2 , g, a) with Weibull baseline.
The continuous unobserved heterogeneity approach has been criticized by Singer (1984a,1984b) , who argued that it overparametrizes the model and emphasized that an incorrect choice of G (e.g., the Gamma earlier) leads to inconsistent estimates of the parameters of interest b. Instead, they suggest a nonparametric maximum likelihood estimate of the mixing distribution on the basis of the results of Lindsay (1983a Lindsay ( ,1983b . The idea is to model v by using a discrete distribution, P(v = v j ) = p j , with J support points v j and associated probabilities p j , j = 1, . . ., J. Using this discrete distribution for G in (20) leads to the log likelihood function
The parameter vector θ is estimated by maximizing (25), subject to v 1 = 1 (for identification) and
Heterogeneity beyond that controlled for through observed regressors x may be present regardless of the sampling scheme, simply as a part of correct distributional specification, and hence estimation of the generalized models is of interest in a likelihood context in any case. Following Singer (1984a,1984b) , in the presence of heterogeneity, individuals with long durations may be overrepresented in our (stock) sample, and the portion of this selection effect not controlled through included regressors leads to a bias. As already noted, the selectivity bias should be mitigated by including wealth in x as this acts as a proxy for elapsed duration. The unobserved heterogeneity methods should control for additional heterogeneity, whether intrinsic to the distributional specification or arising because wealth is only an imperfect proxy. We consider the alternative discrete and continuous specifications that have been used in different parts of the literature, and although they do not necessarily cover all cases of potential interest, further generalizations are beyond the scope of the present paper.
Empirical results
Results of maximum likelihood estimation using log likelihood function (10) for the full sample are shown in Table III . Panel A shows results for the general background, labor market, educational, and occupational explanatory variables from Table II Table III . The first two columns of each panel in Table III are for the case without baseline duration dependence. Numbers in the first column are parameter estimates. Asymptotic standard errors are given in the second column. Coefficients are set in bold face if significantly different from zero at the 5% level and in italics if significant at 10%. Results for Weibull and nonparametric baseline specifications are reported in a similar fashion in the remaining four columns of the table. Most explanatory variables are significant at 5%, across panels as well as model specifications.
3.3.1. No baseline duration dependence. The case of no baseline duration dependence, (15), is of interest because this is where the regressors x k are required to explain all variation in the hazard. From the first line in the first column of Table III , married individuals tend to retire later (negative coefficient, i.e., lower retirement hazard) than singles in these data. This is perhaps surprising and not in accordance with results in the literature (e.g., Hurd (1990) ). We return to this point later. From the next line, male continue working longer than female individuals, which accords better with the literature (e.g., Antolin and Scarpetta (1998) , Heyma (2004) ). Living in the Copenhagen metropolitan area decreases the retirement hazard, consistent with the findings of An et al. (2004) who also used Danish data and attribute the effect to higher housing prices in the capital. Magnitudes are meaningful, for example, the hazard is about 35% lower for men than for women, all else equal. 7 3.3.1.1. Labor market variables. Working full time is associated with stronger attachment to the labor market. The retirement hazard is more than one-third lower than for individuals not working full time. Retirement rates increase with the unemployment rate, consistent, for example, with Lindeboom (1998) . This effect may be understood by recalling that a portion of the individuals at risk is unemployed and seeking employment. Higher unemployment rates may be associated with increased layoff rates combined with decreased job-finding opportunities. In addition, the effect may be related to the government's attempts to reduce youth unemployment by providing incentives for the older generation to retire.
Greater labor market experience is associated with higher retirement hazard. The magnitude of the effect is considerable. As experience in these data runs from 0 to 21 years and is scaled to between 0 and 1, the estimated coefficient indicates that an additional year of experience increases the hazard by about 15% on the margin.
8 Individuals who have participated over a long period have had more years to build up retirement savings, have possibly contributed to a pension fund, and are more likely to meet eligibility criteria. In particular, the attractive early retirement program requires membership of a UI fund for sufficiently long (see Section 3.4.0), and membership can only be maintained for a limited period if the individual is unemployed. This helps explain the increase in retirement hazard associated with both higher experience and UI fund membership (the next variable in the Labor Market group in the table).
The retirement hazard is more than twice as high for a worker who has received sickness pay during the year. This seems reasonable because poor health increases the individual's uncertainty about the future in the labor DIAGNOSIS CODES AND EARLY RETIREMENT market and also may lower human capital as in the case of a long unemployment spell (see, e.g., Diamond and Hausman (1984) , Antolin and Scarpetta (1998) ). Including disease indicators on the basis of objective diagnosis codes as additional regressors in Panel B beneath allows deriving a more detailed picture of the effect of health on retirement behavior.
3.3.1.2. Education. Generally, a higher level of education is associated with later retirement. The reference group is individuals with basic education (no education beyond high school). The finding is in agreement with the empirical literature, for example, Diamond and Hausman (1984) . People with higher education may have a lower replacement rate if entering a retirement scheme. Furthermore, this group has had a delayed entry into the labor market. The estimated effect is not monotonous in education level. Thus, medium duration higher education is associated with higher retirement rate than short duration higher education, and the medium category, in fact, covers more observations than the short and long together (see Table II ). Indeed, Lindeboom (1998) found a positive effect of higher education on the retirement rate.
3.3.1.3. Occupation. The reference group is high level salaried workers, and compared with this, workers in other occupations exhibit higher propensities to retire. This is consistent with human capital theory and the empirical results in Heyma (2004) . A person in a high-salary job has likely made greater career investments and had a relatively late entry and is therefore less likely to move to nonemployment, see Fields and Mitchell (1984) . Low level salaried (skilled blue-collar) workers exhibit higher retirement rates than the medium level group. The unskilled group is between the two but should have been higher for a complete ordering according to the occupation-skill hierarchy. Finally, because the positive coefficient for the self-employed is the lowest of the coefficients in the Occupation group, only high-salary workers retire less. That these two groups work longest is similarly in line with the literature, for example, Antolin and Scarpetta (1998) using German data, although they found the self-employed to retire least of all, which would correspond to a negative coefficient for self-employment in our case.
3.3.1.4. Financial variables. Turning to Panel B of Table III , first column, individuals with higher income are less likely to retire, consistent, for example, with Diamond and Hausman (1984) . The substitution effect dominates the income effect. Leisure is relatively more expensive for the highly paid. This group may also have saved more, thus increasing the incentive to retire, but this effect is too weak to match the substitution effect or it is controlled for by inclusion of wealth in the multiple regression setup. Indeed, the coefficient on wealth is positive, albeit insignificant in the first column. It is conceivable, of course, that the estimated coefficient on wealth is a combination of a positive income effect (the wealthy can afford to retire) and a negative effect stemming from wealth acting, in part, as a proxy for elapsed duration prior to age 50, that is, individuals who have previously had strong labor force attachment continue to do so. The coefficient on own income is stronger than that on household income, which is natural, as the latter acts more like wealth. From the point estimate, because the financial variables enter logarithmically, a 10 % increase in own income nearly cuts the retirement probability in half. In a broad sense, that working longer is associated with higher income is consistent with the findings earlier that it is also associated with longer education, higher occupation, and working full time. Thus, overall, the results for the explanatory variables considered so far make sense and suggest that there is nothing unusual in our sample, compared with the literature.
3.3.1.5. Health. We now consider the effects of health shocks, as captured by objective medical diagnosis codes, the explanatory variables of main interest in this study. Multiple dummy variables for different disease categories can take the value one simultaneously. An alternative approach would be to include a series of lagged dummy variables or other variables designed to capture a health stock effect, but our focus is on the effect of health shocks (recent changes to the stock), presumably the most important determinants, and we retain the parsimonious specification without further lags. From Table III , Panel B, first column, we obtain several significant effects of these health events on retirement. Positive coefficients are expected under the assumption that health shocks may spur withdrawal from the labor market. Indeed, with only a single exception, all significant coefficients on diagnosis codes are positive. The exception is the negative coefficient for malignant cancer. As this stands out as a peculiar result, possible reasons behind it have already been discussed in Section 1. The corresponding coefficient for benign cancer is insignificant. Retirement hazards are increased by mental and behavioral disorders, diseases of the nervous, circulatory, respiratory, and musculoskeletal systems and by endocrine, nutritional, and metabolic diseases. Retirement is not significantly impacted by diseases of the digestive or genitourinary systems or by injury, poisoning, and so on, according to this categorization. The highest coefficient and t-statistic (t = 5.98) are associated with diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue, which include arthritis and rheumatism. An individual obtaining a diagnosis from this category, or from diseases of the circulatory system, experiences a more than 50 % increase in retirement probability. The other significant coefficients imply increases by more than a third in retirement hazards for these diseases, that is, also strong effects, and sharply distinct from the negligible effects of diseases of the digestive and genitourinary systems and of injury, poisoning, and so on.
The last results in the first column show that more hospital admissions and days of treatment during the year are associated with higher retirement hazard, as expected, broadly consistent with the positive effect of having received sickness pay in Panel A. Persons receiving many diagnoses actually retire less, which is perhaps surprising, and may suggest that serious diseases tend to generate only a single or a few diagnoses.
The results confirm the empirical relevance of using objective diagnosis codes as explanatory variables in retirement analysis and reinforce the notion that changes in health impact actual labor market behavior. The diagnosis codes capture a multidimensional force with distinct effects for different conditions, even when controlling for a number of other health-related variables, such as sickness pay, duration of hospital treatment, number of admissions, and so on. Presumably, because the diagnosis codes are objectively measured, in contrast to self-reports, they should be precise and not subject to endogeneity problems. Consequently, the estimated coefficients should be reliable and in particular, should not suffer from attenuation and/or endogeneity biases. Thus, the project of adding these variables to the retirement analysis is so far successful.
In the following, we examine whether these findings hold up as we generalize the estimation technology along a number of dimensions. In particular, we consider in turn more flexible duration dependence, unobserved heterogeneity, separate estimation by gender, and a multivariate model for distinct exit routes.
3.3.2. Duration dependence 3.3.2.1. Weibull baseline. Results from estimation with the more flexible Weibull baseline hazard l(t) = at a À 1 g from (16) appear in the third and fourth columns of Table III . Both point estimates and asymptotic standard errors are very similar to those obtained without accounting for baseline duration dependence earlier, with a few exceptions. First, in Panel A, the very large magnitude of the experience effect without baseline duration dependence is more moderate in the Weibull case, which is natural because experience increases with duration for working individuals. Secondly, self-employed workers exhibit a lower retirement hazard than all other occupational groups, including high level salaried workers. The estimated coefficient for self-employment is negative and significant, with a t-statistic of À 9.1. This result lines up even better with that of Antolin and Scarpetta (1998) than does the result obtained using exponential baseline. Third, in Panel B, greater wealth now significantly increases the retirement hazard. From the point estimate, a doubling of wealth increases the probability of retiring during the year by about 9 % (coefficient Á log(2) Á 100 %). The associated t-statistic is 2.8. This is interesting from a number of perspectives. For one, wealth effects are often difficult to detect because of poor data quality (measurement error in wealth). Secondly, the opposite signs on income and wealth make sense as substitution and income effects. Income indicates the price of leisure, and wealth determines the budget.
The results on experience, self-employment, and wealth suggest that allowing for baseline duration dependence is empirically relevant and produces meaningful changes in estimates. Indeed, the fourth line of Panel A shows that log(a), the logarithm of the Weibull shape parameter, at .63, is greater than zero (the exponential case), and the result is significant (t = 3.2). Positive duration dependence makes sense in the context, that is, all else equal, retirement becomes more likely with increasing age, and it is part of this effect that is captured by the stronger positive coefficient on experience with constant instead Weibull baseline.
The findings on the objective diagnoses are very similar in the constant and Weibull baseline cases, both in terms of point estimates and significance. In particular, seven separate groups of diseases have distinct significant impacts on the retirement hazards. Given the meaningful changes in inference for the other variables when introducing duration dependence, this serves as a useful robustness check on the estimated effects of health changes on labor supply. Table III show the results using an even more flexible nonparametric baseline, treating the Λ k in (13) as separate incidental parameters in the semiparametric setup, instead of the constant or Weibull specifications of the previous two parametric models. The number of person-year observations is now slightly less, for numerical reasons (see Section 2), but 78,150 is nevertheless a large number. In Panel B, the same seven disease categories remain significant under nonparametric baseline and retain the same signs and orders of magnitude as in the foregoing models. The coefficient on Mental and behavioral disorders increases and the associated standard error decreases across the table as the baseline hazard is freed up. Clearly, Mental and behavioral disorders are revealed as very important determinants of retirement, with a t-statistic now in the vicinity of 5, compared with just below 2 in the first model. Receiving a diagnosis in this category during the year more than doubles the retirement hazard. In addition, two more disease groups turn significant. Thus, an increase in retirement hazard is associated with benign cancer, as well as with injury, poisoning, and other external causes. These diagnosis codes replace number of diagnoses and admissions as significant regressors. As this model is more flexible and less likely to be misspecified, the results show that objective diagnosis codes indeed provide useful means of capturing the effects of health shocks on retirement behavior-more useful than general measures (admissions, etc.).
Nonparametric baseline. The last two columns of
In Panel A, estimation of the nonparametric baseline does come at the cost of losing significance of marital status, as well as medium and long educations. Furthermore, working full time is now only significant at the 10 % level. Self-employment again obtains a positive coefficient, as in the first model, and now the coefficients for medium, low, and unskilled workers show that the hazard is monotonically decreasing in skill level. Own income and household income obtain opposite signs, consistent with the notion that the substitution effect dominates for own income, whereas household income (including in particular spouse's income) is treated more like wealth. Thus, for household income, the income effect dominates, subsuming even the effect of wealth that was significant with Weibull baseline. Wealth may be measured with more error than household income and serves, in addition, as proxy for elapsed duration (see Section 1), both pulling the estimate in the opposite direction. Figure 2 shows the estimated exponential, Weibull, and nonparametric log baseline hazards. Although the nonparametric hazard is nearly monotonically increasing, consistent with the Weibull estimate, there is a local peak at 60 (the early retirement eligibility age) and a trough at 62, coinciding with those in the Kaplan-Meier hazard in Figure 1 . Furthermore, the overall slope of the nonparametric hazard is steeper than that of the Weibull. These observations confirm that the nonparametric specification is an improvement.
3.3.3. Unobserved heterogeneity. Table IV shows the results from estimation allowing for unobserved heterogeneity, as represented by v in (18). We consider first a parametric approach, with Gamma unobserved heterogeneity as in (22) and either constant or Weibull baseline hazard, using (15) and (17), respectively, for Λ l in the log likelihood (24), and then a semiparametric approach with discrete unobserved heterogeneity (using J = 2 support points) combined with nonparametric baseline hazard, that is, treating b, v 2 , p 2 , Λ 1 , . . ., Λ K as separate parameters in (25).
In Panel A, there is now significantly less retirement among the married across all three baseline specifications, including the nonparametric that produced an insignificant result for this variable without unobserved heterogeneity (Table III) , even though the point estimate is smallest in this case. Similarly, the effect of long education is now significantly negative throughout, as well, even though with nonparametric baseline the point estimate (at À.21) is smaller in magnitude than for short education, and medium educations remains insignificant, as in the corresponding model without unobserved heterogeneity (last model in Table III ). In the Weibull baseline, the positive duration dependence is much more pronounced when allowing for unobserved heterogeneity. The point estimate of the log Weibull parameter in Table IV is more than twice that in Table III , and the standard error drops an order of magnitude, suggesting that estimated duration dependence in Table III picks up a combined effect of true duration dependence and left out unobserved heterogeneity. Also in the Weibull case, the apparent negative effect of self-employment drops out when moving from Table III to  Table IV , leaving inference closer to that with other baseline specifications and thus reinforcing the impression that both duration dependence and unobserved heterogeneity are at work. Interestingly, sickness pay is strongly significant and returns nearly the same point estimate and t-statistic throughout Tables III and IV. This shows that some individuals experience gradual changes that may not lead to hospitalization but still restrict them in doing their work or at least influence the relative preferences for income and leisure. From the point estimate, having received sickness pay during the year more than doubles the probability of retiring.
In Panel B of Table IV , the result that benign cancer significantly increases the retirement hazard once nonparametric baseline is allowed for carries over to the case with unobserved heterogeneity. All other qualitative results on diseases and other explanatory variables similarly agree with those in Panel B of Table III , and magnitudes are close. As there is the least risk of misspecification when allowing for both unobserved heterogeneity and nonparametric baseline, the cases where inferences from this specification (last model in Table IV) agree with those from simpler specifications should be relatively reliable, except that the puzzle regarding survivors of malignant cancer remains. Such agreement across specifications applies to most variables. In particular, the hazard is increased by the unemployment rate, experience, UI fund membership, receipt of sickness pay, mental and behavioral disorders, diseases of the nervous, circulatory, respiratory, and musculoskeletal systems, endocrine, nutritional, and metabolic diseases, and days of treatment. The hazard is reduced by the variables Male, City, Working full time, and Own income. It is not affected by diseases of the digestive and genitourinary systems or diagnoses in the residual category of other diseases. In other cases without such agreement, inferences from the most general models are probably preferred, so by this criterion, injury, poisoning, and other consequences of external causes may also spur retirement. By the same token, married status and skill level reduce retirement. There is even an indication that wealth may, too (significance at 5% in the parametric case and 10% in the nonparametric in Table IV) , presumably through its role as proxy for elapsed duration (see Section 1), thus suggesting that the purpose of mitigating any potential selection bias is being served. Indeed, the more negative impact of wealth in Table IV compared with Table III suggests that explicit modeling of unobserved heterogeneity and proxying for elapsed duration using wealth act more as complements than substitutes in controlling for the difference between individuals with weak and strong labor supply attributes.
In the most general model so far, with nonparametric baseline, all significant coefficients on diagnosis codes (last two columns of Table IV, Panel B) are equal to (up to two digits) or greater in magnitude than the corresponding point estimates in Table III , Panel B. The same is true using a constant or Weibull baseline, with the exception of a single case (musculoskeletal system and the coefficients are nevertheless close). Mental and behavioral disorders increase retirement hazards more than any other disease category, and the importance of this group increases further in all three models in Table IV , compared with the corresponding results in Table III , suggesting that individuals behave differently, and unobserved heterogeneity correction helps determine the true strength of the impact of these disorders. The second strongest impact is found for diseases of the musculoskeletal system, and the circulatory system is third.
Ignoring unobserved heterogeneity when it exists will always lead to a downward bias in the estimated hazard because of attrition Singer (1984a,1984b) ), and the associated attenuation bias on individual coefficients is toward zero. Our results are consistent with this, with most coefficients greater in magnitude in Table IV than in Table III , thus reinforcing that unobserved heterogeneity is present. Indeed, in the bottom portion of Table IV, Panel B, the Gamma mixture distribution parameter for the exponential and Weibull models (s 2 in (22)) and the discrete heterogeneity parameters for the nonparametric specification (v 2 and p 2 in (25)) are all statistically significant (viz., s 2 > 0, v 2 6 ¼ 1, p 2 = 2 {0, 1}). The estimated discrete mixture implies that p 2 = 14 % of the sample behaves differently and has v 2 = 1.4, corresponding to a 40% higher retirement rate for this group, all else equal. Thus, the results strongly suggest that baseline hazard and homogeneity restrictions that may imply misspecification should be relaxed.
The effect on the estimated nonparametric baseline hazard of including unobserved heterogeneity is exhibited in Figure 3 . The dashed line represents the estimated log baseline in the model with unobserved heterogeneity (last model in Table IV) , whereas the solid line is that without, repeated from Figure 2 . Introducing unobserved heterogeneity allows the baseline hazard to pick up stronger positive duration dependence, consistent with the difference in the Weibull parameter estimates with and without unobserved heterogeneity (1.39 vs 0.63). The peak and trough at 60 and 62 remain. The semiparametric estimation shows that unobserved heterogeneity makes greater difference in baselines at younger ages (short durations), consistent with the initial sample being more mixed, whereas for long durations individuals with better unobserved characteristics (lower and thus less dispersed v) tend to dominate. This suggests that when unobserved heterogeneity is left out of the estimation, the positive trend in wealth substitutes for part of the slope of the baseline, pulling the coefficient on wealth up, whereas including unobserved heterogeneity allows wealth to serve its role as proxy for elapsed duration-the coefficient drops in Table IV , hence reinforcing that elapsed duration (as proxied by wealth) and unobserved heterogeneity act as complements in selection correction for the underrepresentation of the low wealth, short duration workers at 50.
3.3.4. Gender differences. Small sample size has often forced researchers to control for gender only by including a gender dummy among other regressors. However, some of the earlier retirement studies not using diagnosis codes (e.g., Lindeboom (1998), An et al. (2004) ) suggest that there may be gender differences in several coefficients. We continue with the general specification allowing for nonparametric baseline hazard as well as unobserved heterogeneity (the last model in Table IV ) and fit this separately to the male and female subsamples to examine whether there are gender differences in the effects of diseases and other explanatory variables on retirement behavior.
The results appear in Table V . In the first line, we now find that the significant reduction in retirement hazard associated with married status in the full sample only remains in the male subsample. In the female subsample, the effect is reversed. The retirement hazard is significantly higher for married women than for the unmarried. The point estimate when applying the same model to the full sample, at À.08 in Table IV , is in between the two subsample estimates in Table V (À.29 for males vs .14 for females), and this is so for all the variables in Panel A of the two tables, which makes sense. One interpretation of the result for marital status is that married women can better afford to retire as they are provided for by their working husbands. The husbands work longer than single men to compensate for the loss of wife's earnings. From the point estimates, being married reduces the retirement hazard for men by one quarter, about as much as having short or long higher educations, as opposed to basic or vocational training. For women, married status increases the retirement hazard by as much as being member of a UI fund.
The city variable, significantly negative in the full sample (lower retirement rates in the capital), is now only significant among women. Working full time reduces the hazard for men, consistent with the findings for the full sample, whereas the effect is insignificant for women. The increase in retirement hazard with experience is driven by the female subsample. The remaining labor market variables have the same qualitative effects as in the full sample.
In the previous estimations, the vocational, short, medium, and long education variables generally obtained negative coefficients (recall that the left out category is basic education), but monotonicity (less retirement with higher education) was violated in Tables III and IV by the coefficient for medium length education being too high (too small in magnitude) and even insignificant in the most general model with nonparametric baseline (both tables). From the separate estimation by gender, the explanation is seen to be that medium length education, in fact, obtains a significantly positive coefficient for women. Medium length educations pursued by women typically lead to careers as nurse, school teacher, social worker, or similar jobs that are not highly paid relative to the educational requirements, but are nevertheless demanding for older workers. Medium length educations pursued by larger fractions of men include engineer, accountant, army officer (mandatory retirement from army at 60 but may then pursue alternative career), and so on, and this may explain the gender difference in the result. In addition, the results show that the reduction in retirement for vocational training is driven by the female subsample, and those for short and long higher educations by the male subsample.
The effects of the occupation indicators do not change much compared with previous estimations and are similar across gender, except that the positive effect (earlier retirement) of being an assisting spouse is only significant among women. This makes sense because husbands are older than wives on average, and it is plausible that wives working as assisting spouses retire at the same time as their husbands (business closure). If the husband selects a normal retirement age, this makes the wife's retirement age relative low. On the other 
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hand, few husbands work as assisting spouses, and those who do will not exhibit particularly low retirement ages even if retiring jointly with their wives who on average are younger. Turning to the financial and health variables in Panel B, the negative effect on retirement hazard of own income from the full sample in the previous tables carries over to each subsample in Table V . The result that the substitution effect dominates the income effect for both men and women is consistent with Blau (1997) , using US data, and An et al. (2004) , using data from Denmark. The opposite coefficient on household income is now no longer significant for men but much stronger for women than in the full sample, consistent with the notion that, particularly, women treat household income (especially husband's income) as wealth in retirement considerations. The result that the positive cross-effect of income is the strongest for females is consistent with Blau (1997) .
The puzzle that surviving malignant cancer reduces the retirement hazard is much more strongly present in the male than in the female subsample. The coefficient was À.66 in the full sample, with a t-statistic of À 5.67, and again, this full sample point estimate is about halfway between the male and female subsample estimates. The coefficient for men is À 1.26, more than four times that for women, and with a t-statistic of À 6.40. The coefficient in the female subsample is À.28, for a t-statistic of À 1.80. This is insignificant in a two-sided test at level 5% (critical value À 1.96), and a one-sided test should really be against positive values.
10 Apparently, if any of the possible mechanisms driving the negative result as discussed in Section 1 is at work, then this is particularly strong in men. Similarly, the effect that benign cancer induces retirement (full sample, last model in Table IV) is, in fact, specific to men.
The effect of endocrine, nutritional, and metabolic diseases is now only significant at a 10% level for men and insignificant for women, whereas it was significantly positive in the full sample. The increase in hazard is stronger for women and weaker for men than in the full sample in case of diseases of the nervous, circulatory, respiratory, and musculoskeletal systems. The greatest gender differences are seen in the effects of diseases of the circulatory and musculoskeletal systems, with women responding with earlier retirement than men in these cases. In contrast, the increase in retirement hazard associated with mental and behavioral disorders is stronger among men than among women. The effect of diseases of the genitourinary system, insignificant in the full sample, now becomes significant at the 10% level, with a positive coefficient for women and perhaps surprisingly a negative coefficient for men. Significance of injury, poisoning and other consequences of external causes is lost when separating the sample by gender. Diseases of the digestive system, number of diagnoses, and number of admissions remain insignificant in the separate subsamples, as in the full sample. The effect of days of treatment is significantly stronger for women than for men.
The estimated unobserved heterogeneity distributions show that within each subsample, the mixing probability is significantly different from both zero and unity and the estimated support point from unity. Thus, accounting for unobserved heterogeneity remains relevant even after separating the sample by gender. Unobserved heterogeneity is more extreme among men than women, with an estimated support point v 2 further from the normalized v 1 = 1 and applying to a smaller deviating subpopulation (9% vs 15% for women).
Overall, the results confirm the feasibility of separate estimation by gender of the general model. Indeed, estimated coefficients do differ by gender. This is not due to a difference in estimated baselines because they are similar across gender, see Figure 4 , and to that for the full sample in Figure 2. 
Competing risks
The impact of health, financial, and other explanatory variables on retirement behavior may differ considerably by program. Health should be a deciding determinant for disability retirement, whereas financial incentives may weigh relatively more heavily in more voluntary decisions. To investigate these issues, we consider a multivariate competing risk model separating the alternative labor market exit routes.
Our implementation includes five distinct routes. This specification is already very general, and for purposes of parsimony and adequate sample size for each program, we again control for gender through a dummy rather than by sample separation (as in the previous section). Also, because of the dimensionality in the competing risk case, it would be hard to identify both unobserved heterogeneity and nonparametric baselines jointly. Ridder (1987) showed analytically and by simulation that flexible baselines are more important for the regression parameters b than correct unobserved heterogeneity specification, and separating exit routes should reduce the role of unobserved heterogeneity, anyway. Consequently, we drop the unobserved heterogeneity correction (it was treated in the previous two sections) and concentrate on separate regression parameters and flexible nonparametric baseline hazards for all exit routes. Indeed, there is some specific interest in the differences between baselines corresponding to distinct labor market exit routes.
3.4.1. Likelihood function-competing risk. In the competing risk framework (see Han and Hausman (1990) , Sueyoshi (1992) ), probability (8) of surviving the k′th interval given survival through the first k À 1 is generalized to
where R is the number of competing risks, h r (t|x k ) is the hazard for exit via route r, and
The interpretation of coefficients on explanatory variables is slightly more delicate in the competing risk framework than in the single risk case. In particular, given retirement at t, the conditional probability that exit is through the rth route is Pr r ð jt;
and the partial of this with respect to a given covariate depends on all parameters and may not even have the same sign as the associated regression coefficient in h r . A covariate that increases the hazard of retirement through route r could increase the hazards of retirement through other routes even more. To obtain a better interpretation of coefficients, we assume a proportional hazard for each risk, that is, the generalization of (11) is
where l r and b r denote the destination-specific baseline and sensitivities to explanatory variables. In this case, the interpretation of regression coefficients as proportional changes in hazards carries over from the single risk case (see (12)),
so that, in particular, the sign of every coefficient does reflect the direction of change of the hazard for the associated exit route with respect to the relevant covariate. 11 Indeed, it is possible to interpret differences between coefficients on a given covariate across hazards of different exit routes r in terms of the relative effects of the covariate in question on conditional probabilities (28) of exit through the alternative routes. This is a new result and therefore stated as a theorem. Thus, let m denote the number of explanatory variables, and write
Theorem 1 If the coefficient on the ith covariate is greater for exit route r than for exit route s,
then the conditional probability ratio of exit routes r and s, given exit at t, increases with the ith covariate,
where x k = (x k ; 1 , . . ., x k ; m )′.
Proof
Substituting (29) in (28) and forming the ratio, we obtain
and the result follows.■ In the special cases of the largest and smallest coefficients on a given explanatory variable, across all exit routes, the probability ratio against all other routes is increasing and decreasing, respectively, by the theorem. Because conditional probabilities (28) must sum to unity across exit routes, they cannot all be decreasing, and neither can they all be increasing. Thus, at least one of them is increasing (generically, unless they are all constant, a degenerate case), and at least one is decreasing. By the theorem, the ratio of the probability of the route with the largest (respectively, smallest) coefficient to the probability that is increasing (decreasing) is itself increasing (decreasing). It follows that a given covariate increases (decreases) the conditional exit probability through the route with the largest (respectively, smallest) associated regression coefficient. This was shown earlier, by Thomas (1996) , and is included here as a corollary.
Corollary 1
If the coefficient on the ith covariate is greater (less) for exit route r than for all other exit routes,
s = 1, . . ., R, s 6 ¼ r, then the conditional probability of exit through route r, given exit at t, increases with the ith covariate,
Again, the result by Thomas (1996) only applies to the largest and smallest coefficients on a given covariate. It does not allow comparison with other exit routes. In particular, the covariate in question could increase (decrease) the conditional exit probability for another route regardless of the sign of the associated coefficient. In contrast, our aforementioned theorem allows comparison of all coefficients across all exit routes.
In (26), we now have
with
l r t ð Þdt the rth integrated hazard. The conditional probability of an exit through route r in interval k is 1 À a r k , and the total conditional retirement probability is 1 À Q R r¼1 a 
where the right-censoring indicator is 1
The log likelihood function for a sample of n individuals (indexed by i) is
This is maximized numerically with respect to the parameter vector
, again by using the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno algorithm.
3.4.2. Results-competing risk. The R = 5 labor market exit routes we consider are disability, early retirement, unemployment followed by early retirement, unemployment followed by exit routes other than early retirement and finally, all other programs. No major reform of the retirement system in Denmark took place during our study period, from 1985 to 2001. Disability is available to all individuals aged between 18 and the OAP age of 67, conditional on a complex set of medical and social criteria being met. Applicants must be permanently unable to work, and may not receive any other type of pension. It is required that all possibilities of improving applicants' labor market qualifications, such as rehabilitation, treatment, active social policy, and so on, have been tried. 12 The early retirement or post employment wage program is available to individuals between the ages of 60-66 who are members of a UI fund and in addition to the mandatory fee, have been paying a separate post employment wage contribution for 10 of the last 15 years (20 of the last 25 years from 1992). Eligibility criteria do not include poor health, and the program may be entered from either working or unemployed state, so early retirement shares similarities with many labor market and private pension schemes around the world, including the US. Employers also contribute to this retirement scheme, which is actuarially attractive but unavailable once the disability route has been selected. The unemployment state is defined by receipt of UI benefits, which requires membership of a UI fund combined with active work for at least a year prior to losing the job and being available for work. UI fund membership is voluntary in Denmark. Benefits are 90% of the previous wage, subject to a ceiling that is binding for most individuals in our sample. Benefits may extend up to 4 years during the sample period. Early retirement benefits equal UI benefits (two-thirds of UI benefits for part-time insured) for the first 2.5 years and are then reduced to 82%. 13 The program was originally introduced in 1979 to reduce youth unemployment by making older workers retire early. Indeed, eligibility requires being fit to work, whereas individuals in poor health are referred to disability, where benefits are less.
14 Finally, the residual category of other programs includes civil service pension, based on the salary at the retirement date and duration of employment as a civil servant, subject to a 10-year minimum and with the requirement that discharge is caused by age or health; transition pay, a temporary scheme in place from 1992 to 1996 for the long-term unemployed (12 of the last 15 months) aged 55-59 (from 1994, also those aged 50-54), with benefits at 82% of UI benefits; private pension savings; and social assistance or welfare, at about three quarters of UI benefits, administered by the municipalities, for individuals out of work and not members of a UI fund. Death could have been considered an additional competing risk, but given the dimensionality of the model already with R = 5, as well as our interest in the different retirement programs and comparability with the single risk results, we continue to handle this event by right censoring.
Table VI summarizes the duration data for each of the five destinations, in this case exit routes, in the same manner as Table I for the full sample. The eligibility age for the early retirement program (second column) is 60, and with workers followed from age 50, the minimum observed duration is 10. Upon reaching eligibility, 13 From 1992, by postponing early retirement until age 63, members may receive full benefits until OAP age. 14 A new flexible early retirement program eliminating the requirement of being fit to work was introduced for those reaching age 60 after July 1, 1999 and so is not relevant for our sample. The same reform changed the OAP age from 67 to 65 but similarly only for younger cohorts not in our sample (see Larsen et al. (2008) for more details on the institutional setting). most of those exiting through this route do so within the first few years. By comparison, exit through the disability route (first column) is much more spread out across all ages as the medical requirements for this program may be met at any age. In fact, there are more exits through this route before reaching early retirement eligibility (duration 10) than after. The third exit route, unemployment followed by early retirement, shows exits (into unemployment) primarily concentrated before duration 10 (age 60, early retirement eligibility). Workers who become unemployed after reaching age 60 and who have paid into a UI fund for sufficiently long have the option of transiting directly to early retirement rather than spending time in the unemployment program and so would not be observed exiting through this route. Those who are (e.g., 63 individuals at duration 11) have to keep paying into the system while unemployed after 60 to fulfill the requirements for early retirement. Most of the third destination exits are at durations 7-9 (ages 57-59), possibly explained by the tendency on the part of firms to lay off older workers at these ages because of dropping productivity. The effect is not explained by the maximum duration of UI benefits, 4 years during the study period (it is now two) because this restriction is waived for those workers between ages 55 and 59 who will become eligible for early retirement by age 60 (having paid into the system for the required number of years). In this manner, UI benefits could extend up to 9 years, thus explaining the earlier exits through this route, starting at duration 1 (two observations).
The next exit route, unemployment followed by other exit routes than early retirement (fourth column in Table VI) , shows exits more spread out than unemployment followed by early retirement because some of the programs following the unemployment spell may commence before age 60, for example, civil service pension and (if health criteria are met) disability. Finally, the residually determined exit route labeled Others in the table is even more spread out, and this includes exits into civil service pension and other schemes not preceded by an unemployment spell, so no particular age or spell duration requirement applies.
Comparing with Table I , the similar full sample durations, the data in Table VI clearly suggest that disaggregating the hazards by the heterogeneous exit routes is relevant. The following analysis examines whether differences by exit route arise in the effects of health, financial, and other explanatory variables, as well. Figure 5 shows the estimated log baseline hazards for the five separate exit routes. The disability baseline is highest throughout and exhibits the least duration dependence. The hazard for unemployment followed by early retirement starts out lowest, then increases steeply, and shows nice continuity at the eligibility age with the estimated baseline for early retirement itself, consistent with the notion that unemployment followed by early retirement is subject to planning based on motives similar to those driving early retirement decisions. Unemployment followed by other programs and other programs themselves have baselines that are similar to each other, positioned in between those for the disability and unemployment followed by early retirement routes, and clearly different from the latter. Table III) is now replaced by a finding that being married increases the hazard of voluntary early retirement and decreases the hazard of labor market exit via the disability route. This underscores the relevance of the competing risk specification, that is, lumping exit routes with opposite characteristics may just result in cancellations and consequently insignificant effects in a single risk estimation.
Looking across all five exit routes in Table VII , it is seen that the highest coefficient on married status indeed is that for early retirement, at .23, and the lowest that for disability, À.68. By the result on (28) by Thomas (1996) , being married increases the conditional probability that a given exit is through the early retirement route and reduces the probability that it is to disability (see Corollary 1). Presumably, early retirement may, in part, be chosen to increase leisure time, and among married individuals, this increased leisure time may be shared with the spouse, so the result is consistent with complementarities in leisure times. On the other hand, if married couples in this manner engage in joint retirement planning, they may not be able to select the disability route because this requires that specific medical criteria be met. The results suggest that a person whose health deteriorates sufficiently to qualify for disability may nevertheless postpone this decision if he or she is married, possibly because the spouse is able to care for the individual in poor health. The magnitude of this effect is considerable, being married roughly cutting the exit rate to disability in half. 15 It is noted that the negative effect of marriage using constant or Weibull baseline (Table III) or unobserved heterogeneity (Table IV) appears to be driven by disability rather than early retirement, hence reinforcing that separating by destination is more informative.
The significant lowering of the retirement hazard when living in the city seen in the previous results is driven only by early retirement, whereas the coefficient is insignificant for disability and indeed positive for the other exit routes in the table. Specifically, by Corollary 1, living in the city does lower the probability that a given labor market exit is to early retirement. This is consistent with the notion that early retirement is the route with strongest voluntary choice element, that is, workers in the city may choose to retire later, but some may be forced into disability for medical reasons, and this could occur regardless of geographical location. On the other hand, all exit routes are chosen later by men than by women, that is, gender has similar effects by exit route.
The single risk results for the labor market attachment variables are driven by early retirement more than disability. Thus, the positive effects of experience and UI fund membership from Table III carry over to the  early retirement portion of Table VII , and both coefficients increase by an order of magnitude. In contrast, both variables obtain negative coefficients for disability. The results make sense because these variables enter the eligibility criteria for the early retirement program. Indeed, the very strong coefficient on experience for the early retirement program, at 5.55, is largest across all exit routes in the table, so by Corollary 1, the probability that a given exit is into early retirement increases with experience. In addition, by the generalization in Theorem 1 to coefficients that are neither largest nor smallest across exit routes, it is seen that the conditional probability ratio between early retirement and disability also increases with UI fund membership. Similarly, the increase in retirement hazard from having had a higher degree of unemployment during the year carries over from the single risk case in Table III to early retirement in Table VII but not to exits via the disability route. By Theorem 1, the conditional odds ratio of early retirement relative to disability increases with the unemployment degree. Theorem 1 is needed for this conclusion because although disability obtains the smallest coefficient across exit routes, and thus the unemployment degree lowers the probability that a given 
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exit is to disability, by Corollary 1, it may lower the hazard of exit through another route even more. Thus, comparison across routes requires Theorem 1. Even larger coefficients on the unemployment degree than that for early retirement are obtained for the exit routes starting with an unemployment spell, the next two exit routes in Table VII , which is natural, so by Corollary 1, more unemployment during the year increases the probability that an exit is via unemployment. The deferral of retirement among full-time workers is common to both disability and early retirement. On the other hand, the previous result that those who have received sickness pay also retire more is not driven by the early retirement destination, where this variable is insignificant. The positive coefficient is recovered for the disability destination, consistent with this being health related. Indeed, the sickness pay coefficient is higher for disability than for any other exit route in the table, implying that receiving sickness pay increases the probability that exits are to disability.
Again, we find a significantly negative effect on retirement from the length of education, and here, signs and significance are more similar across disability and early retirement. The results on education are, in fact, stronger than in the single risk case (Table III) , in terms of magnitude of point estimates and also long education getting a significantly negative coefficient, and this is so for both disability and early retirement. The negative point estimates (the left out group is basic education) are larger for disability than for early retirement and increase in magnitude with length of education within each of these two destinations, except for medium length education that remains insignificant and hence continues to deviate from the overall pattern. Most coefficients are smaller and insignificant for other exit routes in the table. Thus, longer education reduces retirement, particularly through reduced hazards of disability and early retirement, and reduces the probability that labor market exits are due to disability. This is consistent with evidence that individuals with higher education tend to have higher life expectancy and better health outlook because of better cognitive ability and decision making. Other factors that improve with increased educational attainment, such as income, occupational safety, and access to health insurance, are also associated with better health outcomes (see Wong et al. (2002) and Muennig (2005) ), again consistent with lower disability retirement.
The results for occupation are nicely monotonic in level, confirming that employees at higher levels (the left out group is high level salaried workers) exhibit lower retirement hazards than those at lower occupational levels. This is both for disability and early retirement and more or less so for every other destination in the table. For each occupational level (medium, low, and unskilled), the coefficient is higher for disability than for early retirement, so the gradient toward lower retirement for higher level employees is steeper in this sense for disability than for early retirement. Table III results are generally between the disability and early retirement results in Table VII . For assisting spouses, the coefficient is insignificant for disability and positive for early retirement, consistent with assisting spouses retiring voluntarily along with their spouses rather than for medical reasons. For the self-employed, the coefficient is similarly stronger for early retirement than for disability. This is consistent with Antolin and Scarpetta (1998) , as is the result that the self-employed and high level workers have the lowest disability hazards, but our results differ in that the self-employed are the occupational group with highest early retirement hazard of all, presumably a feature of the generous Danish system. In Panel B of Table VII, the previous results from Table III , nonparametric baseline, that the effect of own income on retirement is dominated by the substitution effect and that of household income by the income effect, is seen to be consistent with the results for the disability hazard, whereas the effects are insignificant for early retirement. Magnitudes are substantial: The disability hazard is increased by 15% and reduced by 30% for a 10% increase in household and own income, respectively (t-statistics in excess of 3). The previous insignificant result for wealth is found to be a mixture of two opposing effects: an increase in the early retirement hazard among the wealthy, who can afford this voluntary retirement and hence increase leisure time, along with a decrease in the disability hazard for this group. Indeed, a 10% wealth gain increases the early retirement hazard by more than 50% and reduces the disability hazard by nearly 70% (t-statistics exceed 5). Across all exit routes in the table, the wealth coefficient is the highest for early retirement and the lowest for disability, so an increase in wealth indeed increases the conditional probability that a given exit is into early retirement and decreases the probability that it is into disability. An earlier finding of a negative effect of wealth in Danish data was by Pedersen and Smith (1996) , using a single risk analysis. Our results suggest that the negative effect is driven by disability retirement. Possibly, health is better among the wealthy or they enjoy careers that may more easily be continued while facing deteriorating health and hence may not to the same extent require disability.
Turning to the effects of the health variables, the reduction in retirement after surviving malignant cancer carries over to both disability and early retirement, and the competing risk results also suggest a partial solution to the apparent puzzle. Thus, the coefficient on malignant cancer is negative also for unemployment (next two exit routes in the table), and at À.31, the coefficient for the disability route is actually higher than those for early retirement and unemployment. For the last exit route (other programs), it is negative and rather imprecisely estimated, and we fail to reject that the highest (least negative) malignant cancer coefficient is that for disability. By the result of Thomas (1996) , Corollary 1, the conditional probability that an exit is into disability, given it has taken place, is higher for those who have survived malignant cancer than for others. The puzzle that surviving malignant cancer reduces overall retirement remains, but the fraction of retirement that is into disability is higher among those surviving malignant cancer than among other groups, which makes sense.
Most of the other significant results on the diagnosis codes in Table VII are seen to be driven by exit through the disability route, presumably because this is more health related than early retirement. Furthermore, they match qualitatively the results from the single risk analysis in Table III , so these are mainly driven by disability, as well. The strongest determinants are the circulatory and musculoskeletal systems. Receiving a diagnosis in these categories more than triples the disability hazard (t-statistics exceed 10). This is followed by diseases of the respiratory system, where a diagnosis more than doubles the disability hazard (t = 5.4). All other diagnoses similarly increase the disability hazard significantly, except diseases of the digestive and genitourinary systems and those in the residual group of other diseases. Two of the categories, namely, benign cancer and injury, poisoning, and so on only turned significant in Table III when moving from parametric to nonparametric baseline. Disability obtains the largest coefficient across exit routes in the table for (malignant and) benign cancer, diseases of the circulatory, respiratory, and musculoskeletal systems, and injury, poisoning, and so on, so by Corollary 1, the conditional probability that an exit is into disability is increased by each of these medical conditions. The disability coefficient is not largest across exit routes for endocrine, nutritional, and metabolic diseases, nor for mental and behavioral disorders, but for each of these categories, the coefficient is nevertheless significantly larger for disability than for early retirement. Thus, by Theorem 1, the conditional odds ratio for disability relative to early retirement is higher for individuals receiving these diagnoses.
The disability results show a drop to significance only at a 10% level for endocrine, nutritional, and metabolic diseases, as well as diseases of the nervous system and sensory organs, possibly because of model saturation. Diseases of the genitourinary system appear to decrease the probability of entering disability, whereas it was insignificant before. Comparing across programs in Table VII , it is seen that this type of disease may lead to unemployment. This is interesting because these diseases typically will not qualify an applicant for disability, yet they may apparently influence a person's ability to work on the basis of these results. An increase in the number of diagnoses decreases the hazard rate into disability, whereas the number of admissions and days of treatment increase it. This is as in Table III with constant or Weibull baseline for the overall retirement hazard, and Table VII results imply, in addition, that more admissions lead to a higher probability that any given exit is into disability.
The effect of health variables on early retirement is mostly significant only at 10% or higher, consistent with health problems inducing disability more than retirement via the voluntary labor market-based early retirement route. Indeed, besides malignant cancer, only diseases of the nervous, circulatory, and genitourinary systems remain significant for early retirement, the latter with a negative coefficient, like for disability, and all three only at the 10% level. For the first category, the nervous system, the coefficient is larger for early retirement, at .39, than for disability, at .25. The pattern is reversed for the second category, diseases of the circulatory system, where the coefficient is more than four times larger for disability, at 1.14, than for early retirement, .23. It is possible that the medical criteria for disability are more easily satisfied in case of diseases of the circulatory system, whereas those who have worked sufficiently and paid into the early retirement program along the way are more likely to develop diseases of the nervous system, including, for example, stress-related illnesses.
3.4.2.2. Unemployment followed by early retirement or alternative exit routes. We now take a closer look at individuals for whom unemployment is the last labor market state prior to retirement. They could potentially have been planning their exit from the labor market already at the time of becoming unemployed and hence this analysis. It is especially interesting to distinguish between those whose unemployment spell is followed by voluntary early retirement and those who retire through other routes. In particular, whereas, in general, the maximum period one can receive UI benefits is 4 years, the exception that those UI fund members aged 55-59 who will get entitled to early retirement upon reaching age 60 (having paid into the system for sufficiently long) may continue beyond the 4 years on UI benefits makes it likely that some unemployment spells have been effectively considered as early retirement. In effect, this feature of the system allows for early retirement through the combined unemployment-early retirement route already at the age of 51. We inspect the estimates for indications that the combined unemployment-early retirement route is more similar to other retirement routes, especially the voluntary early retirement route, than unemployment followed by other retirement programs, where the initial unemployment spell is more likely involuntary. Again, this application of the competing risk approach to complete exit routes rather than final destination states is unique to our study.
In Panel A, Table VII , fifth and sixth columns, the male indicator is only significant at 10%. In Table III , as well as for all other exit routes in the competing risk model, male is significantly negative at 5% or better. Furthermore, the point estimate for the combined unemployment-early retirement route is only À.1, as opposed to À.3 or greater (in magnitude) in all other cases. This suggests that, in particular, men use unemployment as an early route into retirement, some likely exploiting the exemption from the 4-year rule. Specifically, by Corollary 1, the conditional probability that a given exit is via unemployment followed by early retirement is higher for men than for women.
Married status is insignificant for unemployment followed by early retirement, just as in the single state model with nonparametric baseline in Table III , but negative for unemployment followed by other programs. Both coefficients are between those from the previous programs, that is, the strong negative coefficient on married for disability and the positive for early retirement. Still, by Theorem 1, being married makes it more likely that labor market exit is through the combined unemployment-early retirement route relative to unemployment followed by other programs. The results suggest that married individuals prefer the early retirement exit route, in some cases achieving a smooth transition to this via unemployment, and in either case, presumably use it as a means of coordinating early retirement with the spouse to enjoy shared leisure time, consistent with complementarity.
Living in the city increases the rate of unemployment followed by early retirement and even more so unemployment followed by other programs, whereas this variable had a negative effect on early retirement itself and on retirement in general in Table III . This shows that the phenomenon of entering into unemployment, then retirement, is a city phenomenon. Indeed, by Corollary 1, the probability that an observed exit is via unemployment is higher in the city than outside.
We find a significant increase from working full time in the hazard for exits via the combined unemployment-early retirement route. The coefficient is the largest across exit routes, so by Corollary 1, the probability that a given exit is through this route is higher for individuals working full time. This is consistent with fulltime workers being eligible for generous UI benefits and often, in addition, attractive early retirement pay. The full-time variable had the opposite sign for straight early retirement and disability retirement. These strong and opposing effects combine to a weaker effect in the single risk analysis with nonparametric baseline in Table III , underscoring again that the competing risk specification is warranted. The coefficient on full time is smaller for unemployment followed by other programs than for unemployment followed by early retirement, and only significant at 10%, consistent with the attractiveness not only of the UI benefit but also the early retirement portion of the combined route.
The coefficient on the unemployment rate (measured before exiting) is higher for the two unemployment exit routes considered than for other programs, consistent with the unemployment state being more easily accessible to the individuals exiting through this route.
Experience reduces the hazard of exiting via unemployment, which makes good sense, in that more experience should make unemployment less likely in general. Experience also obtains a negative coefficient in case of the disability route, but the largest (in magnitude) negative coefficient across exit routes is that for unemployment followed by other programs. By Corollary 1, experience lowers the probability that an observed exit is through this route.
Membership of a UI fund is naturally strongly significant for the two unemployment routes, as for the early retirement route, because membership enters the eligibility criteria in all these cases, whereas it obtains a negative sign for disability, and the combined result in Table III is a (positive) coefficient one order of magnitude smaller. Sickness pay obtains positive coefficients for the unemployment routes, as for disability, whereas there is no effect for the early retirement state, showing that while early retirement is less of a health-based choice, health problems may spur unemployment. Indeed, hazards for the disability and unemployment routes are more than tripled for individuals who have received sickness pay during the year.
Self-employment strongly induces unemployment followed by early retirement, with a coefficient very similar to that for the early retirement route itself, and actually largest across all exit routes, whereas this variable is insignificant for unemployment followed by other programs. This indicates that retirement planning for the self-employed is focused on early retirement, possibly initiated with a voluntary unemployment spell. All other occupation variables obtain coefficients that are positive, similar for the two unemployment routes, and largest across exit routes for the combined unemployment-early retirement route, for each variable. By Corollary 1, the probability that a given exit is via unemployment followed by early retirement is higher for these groups of workers. As the left out occupation group is high level salaried workers, it is this group that shows lower tendency to exit via the combined route.
The education variables drop in significance. We only find a negative effect of short education (at 10%) for unemployment followed by early retirement and a positive effect of long education (again at 10%) for unemployment followed by other programs.
Turning to Panel B of Table VII , on the basis of the financial variables, unemployment followed by early retirement is similar to the early retirement route itself, in terms of signs of coefficients, whereas unemployment followed by other programs is similar to disability. Higher own income lowers exit via both unemployment routes, that is, the substitution effect dominates, whereas household income increases the retirement hazard-the income effect. Indeed, the own and household income coefficients are, respectively the lowest and the highest across all exit routes for unemployment followed by other programs. By Corollary 1, the substitution and income effects make the conditional probability that a given exit is through this route decrease in own income and increase in household income.
The number of significant health variables is higher for the unemployment routes than for early retirement but lower than for disability, which is natural, because of the health-based eligibility criteria for disability. Malignant cancer obtains the lowest coefficients for the unemployment routes, compared with all other programs in the table. By Corollary 1, this shows that the conditional probability that observed exits are into unemployment is lower for those surviving malignant cancer. Endocrine, nutritional, and metabolic diseases obtain higher coefficients for the unemployment routes than for other programs, showing that life style diseases such as diabetes, obesity, and so on may induce unemployment followed by labor market exit. Diseases of the nervous system and sensory organs obtain the highest coefficient across all exit routes for unemployment followed by other programs, showing that Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, sclerosis, hearing loss, and so on may also induce terminal unemployment. Diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue obtain larger coefficients and are more significant for the two unemployment routes than for early retirement. By Theorem 1, arthritis, lumbago, osteoporosis, rheumatism, and so on increase the conditional odds ratio of unemployment relative to early retirement. Furthermore, unemployment is increased by genitourinary diseases that actually reduce disability and early retirement, and these opposing effects were responsible for the combined insignificant result in Table III . Thus, separating the exit routes is necessary to unveil the importance of these diseases (kidney stone, etc.) for labor supply.
We conclude that labor market exit through the terminal unemployment route is more strongly associated with poor health than exit via the early retirement route but less strongly than disability. Unemployment followed by early retirement is different from unemployment followed by other programs, particularly in terms of the effects of financial incentives, and it is more heavily favored by the self-employed. In these respects, the combined exit route is similar to voluntary early retirement itself, whereas other terminal unemployment is more similar to disability. Thus, we have isolated a portion of unemployment that appears planned-perhaps more so by men and to some extent by couples planning shared leisure time. Again, this analysis hinges on the competing risk approach.
3.4.2.3. Other programs. Finally, in the last two columns of Table VII , we consider retirement into other programs in general (civil service pension, transition pay, social assistance, etc.). This is negatively affected if the person is working full time or member of an UI fund. The same pattern is seen for disability, whereas UI fund membership increases the early retirement hazard. The findings seem reasonable because these variables are not part of the eligibility criteria for disability or the programs included in the residual category. In the latter, the UI fund coefficient is the lowest across all exit routes, so the conditional probability that a given exit is into these other programs is lower for UI fund members. On the other hand, experience and the unemployment rate increase retirement in the last category, and sickness pay is insignificant, just as for early retirement, whereas the pattern is opposite in the case of disability, so the residual category is, in fact, different from both disability and early retirement. Presumably, many civil servants make exits in the residual category after many years of service. Because all the labor market variables except UI fund membership have the same sign and significance as for early retirement, these other programs appear to be used by civil servants in place of early retirement in case of ineligibility. In addition, welfare is among the other programs and would cover individuals without both work and UI fund membership. Medium length education as the only type of education reduces retirement in the residual category, relative to basic education, and this is the only exit route for which medium education differs from basic education. Thus, nurses, school teachers, accountants, and so on are not civil servants and also do not tend to end up on welfare.
Turning to the health variables in Panel B, there are several significant diagnosis code categories, more in line with the number of significant categories in Table III , making other programs more similar to disability than early retirement in this respect. The coefficients on mental and behavioral disorders, diseases of the digestive system (ulcer, hernia, etc.) , and the residual category of other diseases are higher for this exit route than for any other and the latter two categories (digestive and other diseases) only significant for this route. Finally, the conditional probability that exits are through these other programs increases with the number of days of treatment. Perhaps both mental disorders and prolonged hospitalization may send patients on welfare.
Overall, the results of the competing risk analysis reinforce that the labor market exit routes are different and that the health variables matter for all programs, in many important and different ways that we have mapped out.
CONCLUSION
On the methodological side, in addition to the fundamental single risk parametric retirement duration analysis lumping all labor market exit routes and extensions involving unobserved heterogeneity, nonparametric baseline (for a semiparametric model structure), separation by gender, and competing risks, our work includes a number of distinguishing features: First, we use a large, register-based, longitudinal data set involving detailed individual diagnosis codes, along with labor market, financial, demographic, and socio-economic variables, allowing the analysis of the dynamic effects of health shocks on actual labor supply behavior. Second, we use wealth as a proxy for elapsed duration to mitigate the potential selection bias stemming from conditioning on initial participation and in some of our specifications in combination with unobserved heterogeneity. Third, besides the disability state, involving specific medical eligibility criteria, and voluntary early retirement, our application of the competing risk approach also distinguishes two complete multiperiod routes to retirement, namely, unemployment followed by early retirement (because of an exemption in the rules, this unemployment spell may have commenced at age 51 and continued until the early retirement eligibility age of 60) and unemployment followed by other programs (such as disability, civil service pension, or welfare), thus allowing an investigation of whether the former combined unemployment-early retirement route appears more similar than the latter to early retirement itself and hence more voluntary. Finally, we provide a generalization of the result by Thomas (1996) , allowing comparison of coefficients across all states in the competing risk framework, in contrast to having an interpretation only of the smallest and largest coefficients.
Estimation using survey data and hence self-reports of health, even of the more objective (specific) kind, suffer from potential justification, simultaneity, and attenuation bias. The relevant policy issue is that if the estimated effect of health changes on the propensity to withdraw from the labor market is exaggerated, then so is the apparent impact on labor force size of policy decisions regarding investment in the health industry. To the extent that the objective diagnosis codes eliminate the justification bias and the large register panel and period by period changes reduce the error in measurement of true work incapacity, leaving only a reduced attenuation (and any remaining simultaneity) bias, our estimated impact of health changes on labor supply, and hence the potential effect of policy directed toward improved health, should, if anything, be on the conservative side.
On the substantive side, our empirical results indicate a strong impact of health changes on retirementpresumably a true effect and not simply reflecting justification bias, as might be suspected in studies based on survey data. This suggests a large potential for public policy measures intended to retain older workers longer in the labor force. As our results on financial and socio-economic variables similar to those available in surveys and used in studies on other countries make sense relative to the literature, our sample does not appear to be somehow unusual. Hence, the policy implications of our work should have a bearing on other countries, as well.
Summarizing our results, the propensity to retire is higher among individuals who have experienced unemployment or received sickness pay during the year, are not working full time, work in a lower occupation, or have a shorter education. The exception to the pattern within education is that individuals with medium length education exhibit retirement hazards similar to those of individuals with basic education, only. This effect turns out to be driven by women with medium length education, who retire faster even than those with basic education. Careers chosen by women with medium length education include nurse, school teacher, social worker, and so on, jobs that are not highly paid relative to the educational requirements but are nevertheless demanding for older workers. The single state analysis suggests that married individuals postpone retirement, whereas experience and membership of a UI fund induce retirement. The result on married status is apparently in conflict, for example, with Hurd (1990) , but further analysis shows that this tendency is specific to men, and separation by exit route reveals that it is the rate of disability retirement that is reduced, whereas married status increases the rate of voluntary early retirement, consistent with complementarities in leisure times. Similarly, the result on experience is specific to women, and it is voluntary early retirement that is increased by experience and UI fund membership (both enter the eligibility criteria), whereas disability retirement is in fact reduced, as learned from the competing risk analysis.
Individuals with higher own income defer retirement, that is, a substitution effect, consistent with Diamond and Hausman (1984) . The basic parametric analysis suggests that household income (including spouse's income) and wealth are insignificant. Further analysis reveals that higher household income spurs retirement, that is, an income effect, and a full nonparametric baseline hazard specification (picking up positive duration dependence) is required to show this. As household income includes spouse's income, the result is consistent with a positive cross-effect of spouse's income, and we find this is the strongest for women, consistent with Blau (1997) . Further adding unobserved heterogeneity shows that greater wealth actually postpones retirement. Wealth as a control and unobserved heterogeneity may act as complements in capturing the effect of good workers with long elapsed durations, as proxied by higher savings and hence wealth, and therefore greater wealth predicts longer remaining duration until retirement-apparently even after any positive direct (income) effect of wealth on the retirement hazard. Separation by exit routes reveals that these effects of income and wealth characterize the disability hazard, whereas for the voluntary early retirement route, the income variables are insignificant and wealth induces retirement. Furthermore, results on financial incentives and self-employment for the exit route of unemployment followed by early retirement are very similar to those for early retirement itself, whereas those for unemployment followed by other programs are very similar to those for disability. These results suggest that the labor market exit route of unemployment followed by early retirement may to some extent be voluntary, that is, some of this unemployment may be planned.
The detailed diagnosis codes allow investigating the impact of health shocks on actual retirement behavior as they occur. In the single state parametric analysis, retirement hazards are significantly increased by diseases of the circulatory and respiratory systems, the nervous system and sensory organs, the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue, endocrine, nutritional, and metabolic diseases, as well as mental and behavioral disorders. A health shock in either of these categories increases the retirement hazard by about 30% or more. The strongest impact in terms of magnitude and significance is from diseases of the musculoskeletal system, including arthritis, osteoarthritis, Lyme disease, herniated disk, lumbago, osteoporosis, sclerosis, rheumatism, gout, and so on, followed by diseases of the circulatory system, including ischaemic, coronary, cardiovascular and other heart diseases, angina pectoris, heart attack, acute rheumatic fever, high blood pressure, hypertension, stroke, and so on, shocks in both categories increasing the retirement hazard by more than 50% (asymptotic t-statistics of 6). Individuals with more hospital admissions and days of treatment similarly face increased hazard rates, whereas the number of diagnoses during the year reduces the retirement rate possibly because retirement more often is associated with a single or a few serious diagnosis than with many minor ones. On the other hand, retirement is not significantly affected by benign cancer, diseases of the digestive or genitourinary systems, injury, poisoning, or other consequences of external causes. The results are largely confirmed when allowing for a nonparametric baseline, unobserved heterogeneity, or both, with a few important exceptions. Thus, allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in the model reveals a dramatic further increase in the importance of mental and behavioral disorders that now have the greatest impact across all disease categories. Allowing for a nonparametric baseline confirms the increased importance of mental and behavioral disorders and furthermore shows that benign cancer significantly increases the retirement hazard. This is so, too, when allowing for both nonparametric baseline and unobserved heterogeneity in combination, and here, mental and behavioral disorders more than double the hazard (t = 4.7). The estimated heterogeneity distribution suggests that 14% of the population behaves differently, exhibiting elevated hazards, and this specification reveals the highest impact within the single state analysis of mental and behavioral disorders, which include dementia, delirium, schizophrenia, and stress-related disorders.
Separation by exit route in the competing risk framework reveals that the results on the health variables from the single state analysis are to a large extent driven by disability retirement, for which the same pattern of significant coefficients is recovered. Indeed, magnitudes and significance are further increased, with shocks to the circulatory and musculoskeletal systems more than tripling the disability hazard (t-statistics in excess of 10), followed by diseases of the respiratory system, including influenza, pneumonia, bronchitis, asthma, and other lung diseases, shocks here more than doubling the hazard (t > 5), and then benign cancer, mental and behavioral disorders, and injury, poisoning, and other consequences of external causes (bone fractures, dislocations, etc.), all increasing the disability hazard by more than 50% (t > 2.4). Early retirement and the exit routes commencing with an unemployment spell are very different and much less sensitive to health shocks. Number of admissions, diagnoses, and days of treatment are insignificant for these, as are all the disease categories leading to disability just listed, except that diseases of the musculoskeletal system may lead to unemployment (not early retirement). There is a weaker tendency that both disability and early retirement may be spurred by diseases of the nervous system and sensory organs, including Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, epilepsy, sclerosis, migraine, apnea, cataract, hearing loss, and so on. On the other hand, terminal unemployment leading to retirement may result from endocrine, nutritional, and metabolic diseases, including life style diseases such as diabetes, obesity, and so on, and diseases of the genitourinary system, including kidney stone, renal failure, and other diseases of the urinary system and genital organs. Separation by gender shows that the increase in hazard from diseases of the genitourinary system is specific to the female subsample and that from benign cancer and endocrine, nutritional, and metabolic diseases to the male subsample. Among all our results, the negative coefficient on malignant cancer remains a puzzle. We have discussed a number of possible mechanisms that may be behind this finding: the need to compensate for lost work (stronger because of longer hospitalization than in the case of other serious illnesses such as heart attack that is typically resolved after bypass surgery), a psychological boost from surviving (a 'Lance Armstrong effect'), death as a censoring variable not being strictly exogenous with respect to this serious disease, and the difference between the marginal (or partial) and total effects of a health shock, the latter including the portion of the effect operating through increases in variables such as sickness pay, number of admissions, and days of treatment that act more as mediators than confounders. Also, the puzzle primarily exists among men. Finally, to some extent, the data line up in expected order in spite of the negative coefficient, that is, the conditional probability that a given labor market exit is into disability is higher for individuals who have survived malignant cancer than for others. All in all, we do not expect that promoting cancer will extend work lives, but the question as to which of the possible explanations of the result is at work is left for future research. Whatever the answer, it does not appear to have affected our other results in the same manner. Overall, they show that health shocks have an important effect on the retirement decision, even when purged for justification bias through the use of objective medical diagnosis measures. This is so, in particular, for the disability route that would be most susceptible to this bias.
Further indications for future research include adding improved data on program eligibility, health stock (e.g., autoregressive-moving average specifications in health shocks), elapsed duration, and more narrowly defined disease categories, treating death as a separate competing risk rather than a censoring variable, conducting natural experiments (e.g., including data before and after the 1999 reform), and estimating structural models of joint determination of health and labor supply, allowing for explicitly forward-looking behavior (e.g., with respect to future income and health sequences in alternative states). All of these appear as exciting avenues to further knowledge.
